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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Easterday appeals from the district court's decision denying her motion to 
suppress. The district court determined that Deputy Gorrell's search of a purse 
in Easterday's car was valid pursuant to the automobile exception. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Deputy Stacy Gorrell of the Twin Falls County Sheriffs office received 
information that a citizen wanted to recover his vehicle from his ex-girlfriend. 
(8/2/13 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 6-15.) Deputy Gorrell located and stopped the vehicle. 
(8/2/13 Tr., p. 12, L. 19 - p. 13, L. 3.) The vehicle was driven by Easterday. 
(8/2/13 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 10-18.) The vehicle had a bench seat. (8/2/13 Tr., p. 18, 
L. 20 - p. 19, L. 1.) A purse was sitting in the middle of the bench seat. (8/2/13 
Tr., p. 15, Ls. 4-13, p. 18, L. 20 - p. 19, L. 1.) Easterday was not holding the 
purse. (Id.) Nor was the purse on her lap. (Id.) 
Officer Engbaum of the Buhl Police Department assisted Deputy Gorrell 
with the traffic stop. (8/2/13 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 8-13.) Officer Engbaum ran his drug 
dog around the vehicle and the dog indicated on the driver's side and the 
passenger's side door. (8/2/13 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 13-22.) Deputy Gorrell then asked 
Easterday to step out of the vehicle. (8/2/13 Tr., p. 14, L. 19 - p. 15, L. 3.) 
When Easterday exited the vehicle she picked up her purse and took it with her. 
(8/2/13 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 17-25.) Deputy Gorrell informed Easterday that he needed 
to search her purse because the purse was sitting on the seat when the dog 
indicated on the vehicle. (Id; R., pp. 9-10.) Deputy Gorrell searched the purse 
1 
and found methamphetamine, scales, a glass pipe and a spoon. (8/2/13 Tr., p. 
16, Ls. 1-8.) 
The state charged Easterday with Possession of a Controlled Substance 
(Methamphetamine). (R., pp. 63-64.) Easterday moved to suppress the 
evidence obtained as a result of the search of her purse. (R., pp. 82-90.) 
Pursuant to the request of the parties, the district court took judicial notice of the 
preliminary hearing transcript and the probable cause statement. (10/25/13 Tr., 
p. 3, L. 9 - p. 4, L. 4.) 
The district court issued a written memorandum and denied Easterday's 
motion to suppress. (R., pp. 94-106.) The district court found that the purse was 
sitting on the seat next to Easterday when the dog alerted, and at no time did 
Easterday put the purse on her lap. (R., p. 104.) The court also found there was 
no evidence that Easterday made the purse part of her person prior to the time 
that probable cause was established. (R., p. 105.) 
The critical issue in this case is whether Easterday had the 
requisite expectation of privacy at the time that probable cause to 
search the containers in the automobile she was driving was 
established. The bright line rule established in Ross makes clear 
that, in the instant case, there was probable cause to search all of 
[the] containers present in the car that Easterday was driving, 
including her purse, unless Easterday could establish that any 
container was a part of her person. It is undisputed that Easterday 
did not have the purse on her person at the time the dog alerted on 
the automobile. Rather, this Court finds, based upon the record, 
that the purse was sitting on the seat beside Easterday at the time 
that probable cause was established. Unlike the facts in Newsom, 
the facts in the instant case make clear that at no point during the 
deployment of the drug dog did Easterday remove the purse from 
its position beside her and place it on her lap such that it became a 
part of her person, thereby entitling it to protection from the right to 
search containers in a vehicle pursuant to Ross. There is simply no 
evidence in this case that Easterday attempted, in any way, to 
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make the purse a part of her person prior to the time that probable 
cause to search was established. Instead, the purse only became a 
part of Easterday's person when she picked it up and took it with 
her as she exited the vehicle, and that occurred after the drug dog 
had alerted on the vehicle. 
(R., pp. 104-105.) The district court determined that an vehicle occupant cannot 
defeat the search of a container simply by picking up the container after probable 
cause had been established. (R., p. 105.) 
Just as an officer cannot create a right to search under Ross by 
directing a citizen to leave a purse in a vehicle (as in Newsom), a 
citizen cannot defeat that right to search by taking or attempting to 
remove personal property from an automobile and making it part of 
their person after probable cause to search that personal 
property arises. 
(R., p. 105.) Easterday pied guilty, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of 
her motion to suppress. (R., pp. 119-120, 140-146.) Easterday timely appealed 
the district court's order denying her motion to suppress. (R., pp. 140, 164-167.) 
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ISSUES 
Easterday states the issues on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Easterday's motion to 
suppress because Deputy Gorrell impermissibly expanded the 
search of the car to a search of Ms. Easterday's person? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Easterday failed to show the district court erred when it held a drug 




Easterday Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying Her Motion To 
Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Easterday argues she was entitled to suppression of evidence because 
she removed the purse from her vehicle prior to the officer's search of the purse. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Easterday's argument fails because the deputy 
established probable cause to search the vehicle and containers in that vehicle 
before she removed the purse from the vehicle. See State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 
115, 121, 266 P. 3d 1220, 1226 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. Smith, 152 
Idaho at 118, 266 P. 3d at 1223. 
C. When Deputy Gorrell Established Probable Cause To Search Containers 
In the Vehicle The Purse Was A Container In The Vehicle And Not Part 
Of Esterday's Person 
Easterday argues that the purse was not subject to search because it was 
on her person when she exited the vehicle. (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Easterday's 
argument incorrectly applies the automobile exception. Under the automobile 
exception the issue is not whether the container was on her person when it was 
searched, but where the container was when probable cause to search was 
established. 
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"The automobile exception to the warrant requirement authorizes a 
warrantless search of a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe the 
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity." Smith, 152 Idaho at 
120, 266 P.3d at 1225 (citing United States v. Ross, 56 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)). 
"If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully-stopped vehicle, it justifies the 
search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object 
of the search." l.9.. (citing Ross, 56 U.S. at 825.) "The scope of a warrantless 
search of an automobile is not defined by the nature of the container in which the 
contraband is secreted." l.9.. (citing Ross, 56 U.S. at 824.) "Rather, it is defined 
by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to 
believe that it may be found." l.9.. (citing Ross, 56 U.S. at 824.) A drug dog alert 
on a vehicle provides an officer with probable cause to search the vehicle and its 
contents without a warrant. l.9.. (citing State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 824 
P.2d 949, 953 (1991)). 
Contrary to Easterday's argument, an officer is justified in searching any 
container in that vehicle which may have concealed contraband, even if the 
occupant removes that container prior to the search. l.9.. at 121, 266 P.3d at 
1226. In Smith, an officer developed probable cause to search Smith's car when 
the officer saw a marijuana pipe sitting on the front seat. l.9.. at 117, 266 P.3d at 
1222. A large dog in the back of Smith's car was growling at the officer. l.9.. The 
officer asked Smith to remove the dog so he could search the interior of the car. 
19.: "Smith grabbed a backpack from the car and used its straps to take the dog 
from the car." l.9.. On the passenger seat the officer found a small amount of 
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marijuana. Id. The officer then requested Smith put the dog back in the vehicle. 
k!. Smith did so, but continued to hold the backpack. J_g_. The officer asked 
Smith why he was so attached to the backpack, and Smith did not respond. Id. 
The officer instructed Smith to hand over the backpack. J_g_. Inside the backpack 
the officer found a large amount of marijuana and Smith was charged with 
trafficking in marijuana. J_g_. at 117-118, 266 P.3d at 1222-1223. Smith moved to 
suppress the evidence found in the backpack. J_g_. at 118, 266 P.3d at 1223. The 
district court denied his motion to suppress. Id. A jury found Smith guilty and 
Smith appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress. Id. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Smith's 
motion to suppress on two grounds. First, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that 
the officer's search of Smith's backpack was valid as a search incident to arrest. 
J_g_. at 120, 266 P.3d at 1225. And second, and more importantly for this case, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals found the search was authorized by the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement. J_g_. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the officer could search the 
backpack pursuant to the automobile exception because the backpack was 
originally part of the contents of the vehicle and it was immaterial that Smith 
removed the backpack from the vehicle. Id. at 121, 266 P.3d at 1226. 
Under the Ross exception to the warrant requirement, the officer 
had probable cause to search Smith's vehicle and was justified in 
searching any of the vehicle's contents which may have concealed 
contraband. It is immaterial that Smith removed the backpack from 
the car prior to the search as it was originally part of the contents of 
the vehicle. Therefore, under the Ross exception to the warrant 
requirement, the officer's actions in searching Smith's car and its 
contents were proper. 
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!g_. The same analysis that was applied to Smith's backpack should be applied 
to Easterday's purse. As in Smith, Deputy Gorrell established probable cause 
when the purse was in the car, the purse was not on Easterday's person when 
probable cause was established, the purse was removed from the car prior to the 
search, and contraband was found in the purse. The holding in Smith authorizes 
Deputy Gorrell's search of Easterday's purse. 
The cases relied upon by Easterday are distinguishable. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 7-12. (citing State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 979 P. 2d 100 (1998); 
State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 
176, 90 P.3d 926 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 108 P.3d 424 
(Ct. App. 2005)). In Gibson, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a drug dog's 
alert permitted a search of the vehicle under the automobile exception, but the 
justification to search the vehicle did not extend to a search of Gibson's person, 
specifically his wallet. Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281, 108 P.3d at 428. Gibson's 
wallet was in his jacket at the time the drug dog established probable cause to 
search. !g_. In contrast, Easterday's purse was not on her person at the time 
probable cause to search was established, but was sitting separate from her on 
the seat. (R., pp. 104-105.) 
The other cases relied upon by Easterday are inapplicable because they 
analyze the scope of the search incident to arrest exception, and do not examine 
the scope of the automobile exception. The rationale of the search incident to 
arrest exception is different from the rationale of the automobile exception. 
Under the search incident to arrest exception, when an officer makes a lawful 
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custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer, may, as a 
contemporaneous incident to that arrest search the automobile and any 
containers found within the reach of the arrestee. Roe, 140 Idaho at 182, 90 
P.3d at 932 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); State v. 
Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 530, 661 P.2d 311, 315 (1983)); but see Arizona v. 
Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). The purpose of the search incident to arrest 
exception is to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by 
searching the surrounding area. See~ Hoskins v. State, 149 Idaho 815, 817-
818, 242 P. 3d 185, 187-188 (Ct. App. 2010). In contrast the automotive 
exception is based upon the automobile's ready mobility and the lesser 
expectation of privacy in an automobile as compared to the privacy interest in a 
home. See~ Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281-282, 108 P. 3d at 428-429. 
Other than Gibson, the cases cited by Easterday interpret of the scope of 
the search incident to arrest exception. See Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 979 P. 2d 
100 (the arrest of one occupant of vehicle does not justify the search of the 
purse held by another occupant of the vehicle); Holland, 135 Idaho at 163, 15 
P.3d at 1171 (the arrest of one occupant of the vehicle permits the search of 
another occupant's purse, if that purse is left in the vehicle); Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 
183, 90 P.3d 926, 933 (when one occupant of a vehicle is arrested the search 
incident to arrest exception permits the search of an unworn pair of shorts found 
in the vehicle). These cases do not apply to Easterday, because it is undisputed 
that Deputy Gorrell searched the containers in Easterday's car pursuant to 
probable cause established by a drug dog and the automobile exception. (R., 
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pp. 95-97.) The district court found the search incident to arrest doctrine is not 
applicable to this case. (R., p. 97.) 
It is perhaps important to state at the outset what this case does 
not involve. The State does not attempt to justify the warrantless 
search of the purse based upon the search incident to arrest 
doctrine. Indeed, the State concedes that there were no 
independent grounds to search Easterday's property aside from the 
dog alert. The canine alert was on the automobile, not on 
Easterday. There was no basis to arrest Easterday for any crime 
prior to the search of her purse. Accordingly, the search incident to 
arrest doctrine is not applicable to this case. 
(R., p. 97.) The cases, other than Gibson, relied upon by Easterday analyze the 
scope of the search incident to arrest doctrine do not apply to this search 
incident to automobile exception. 
1. The Idaho Court Of Appeals Decisions In Smith And Gibson 
Create A Simple And Workable Rule 
Easterday argues that the district court's decision crates an unworkable 
rule where women would be discriminated against because they carry purses 
and not wallets and where a "game" would be created by which the driver of a 
car would move purses and wallets on and off their persons during the traffic 
stop. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) These arguments are not supported by any 
citations to law or other authority. 
Easterday's argument also ignores the straightforward rule gleaned from 
the Idaho Court of Appeals precedents in Gibson and Smith. In Gibson, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals held that a drug dog's alert permitted the search of the 
vehicle under the automobile exception, but the search did not extend to a 
search of Gibson's person, specifically his wallet. Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281, 108 
P.3d at 428. In Smith, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a backpack is 
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subject to search if it was in the vehicle at the time of probable cause was 
established, even if the defendant subsequently picks it up. Smith, 152 Idaho at 
121, 266 P.3d at 1226. Thus, if a container is not part of the person at the time 
probable cause is established then it is subject to search under the automobile 
exception, even if the defendant subsequently picks it up. 
Easterday's argument that a rule of this nature would discriminate against 
women because women cannot carry their purses while they drive and men can 
carry their wallets while they drive is without merit. First, many men, like women, 
carry satchels, briefcases, tote bags, or other containers that contain 
identification or other personal items. Second, a special "purse" exception to the 
automobile exception, would create an unworkable dilemma for law enforcement 
who would have to determine if a bag, satchel, briefcase, or other container 
would qualify as a "purse" and not be subject to search. 
Instead of creating an arbitrary "purse" rule, this court should simply apply 
the precedent set by Gibson and Smith and hold that if a container is part of a 
person, like in their pocket, at the time probable cause is established to search 
the vehicle then the container is not subject to search under the automobile 
exception, but if it is separate, like sitting on seat, then it is subject to search. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Easterday's Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2014. 
~ Deputy Attorn y General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of December, 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
REED P. ANDERSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
TST/pm 
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